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Abstract 
 
We develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model, which follows the 
directed technical change literature in a context with: two sectors (clean and dirty), by 
allowing the dominance of either the price channel or the market-size channel and by 
considering the possibility of distinct substitutability between sectors in production. The 
aim is to analyze the impact of both the degree of substitutability between technologies 
in production and the degree of scale effects on wage inequality and on environmental 
quality. In particular, we show that when sectors are gross substitutes, an increase in 
relative abundance of clean-labor supply decreases the relative productivity of clean and 
dirty technologies. Moreover, an increase in the relative abundance of renewable capital 
increases the relative productivity of both technologies. The technological knowledge is 
biased towards the clean sector, i.e., the environmental quality is improved, if the 
economy is rich in renewable and clean-skilled capital. The relative return on clean-
skilled capital increases with the relative abundance of clean-skilled labor under 
substitutability and without scale effect. The abundance of natural capital increases 
wage inequality under substitutability. 
 
Keywords: Directed technological change, Clean and dirty sectors, Substitutability, 
Scale effects, Wage inequality, Environmental quality, Endogenous economic growth.  
 
JEL Classification: O30, O41, J31, Q55, Q58. 
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Resumo 
 
Desenvolvemos um modelo de crescimento endógeno com equilíbrio geral, que segue a 
literatura "directed technical change" num contexto com: dois sectores (limpo ou que 
usa energias renováveis, e sujo ou que usa energias fosseis), permitindo o predomínio 
do canal preço ou do canal dimensão do mercado, e considerando a possibilidade de 
substituibilidade distinta entre os setores na produção do bem final compósito. O 
objetivo é analisar tanto o impacto do grau de substituibilidade entre as tecnologias 
como o grau de efeitos de escala sobre a desigualdade salarial e a qualidade ambiental. 
Em particular, mostramos que quando os setores são fortemente substitutos, um 
aumento na abundância relativa de oferta de trabalho para o sector limpo diminui a 
produtividade relativa de tecnologias limpas e sujas. Além disso, um aumento na 
abundância relativa do capital renovável aumenta a produtividade relativa de ambas as 
tecnologias. O conhecimento tecnológico é enviesado para o sector limpo, isto é, a 
qualidade ambiental é melhorada, se a economia é rica em capitais renovável e trabalho 
qualificado para operar no sector limpo. O retorno relativo sobre o capital limpo 
aumenta com a abundância relativa de mão-de-obra limpa com substituibilidade e sem 
efeito de escala. A abundância de capital natural aumenta a desigualdade salarial sob 
substituibilidade. 
 
Palavras-chave: Directed technological change, Setores limpo e sujo, Sustentabilidade, 
Efeitos de escala, Desigualdade salarial, Qualidade ambiental, Crescimento económico 
endógeno.  
 
Código JEL: O30, O41, J31, Q55, Q58. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to growing fossil fuel consumption the climate change is a reality. As a result and 
to cope with the Kyoto Protocol, the governments have been developing efforts in order 
to mitigate environmental issues associated to energy. The main idea is to reduce and to 
control the environmental effects created by firms and consumers. Thus, alternative 
energy sources to fossil fuels are being studied by climate scientists around the world 
(Acemoglu et al., 2012). However, the literature on environmental policies tends to give 
little attention to technological knowledge, by ignoring endogenous technological-
knowledge progress. Therefore, to better understand some associated aggregate 
economic effects, we develop a directed technological change growth model, which 
extends Acemoglu (1998, 2002) formulation, where two types of technologies can be 
adopted: a clean technology, represented by renewable or more environmentally 
friendly sources, and a dirty technology, including fossil fuels. 
According to International Energy Agency (IEA, 2015), energy is responsible for 
80% of CO2 emission and for 2/3 of total greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, 
countries around the world analyze policies capable to limit climate changes and 
promote a sustainable development. The International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA, 2015) defends the use of clean technologies. This Agency reveals that, until 
2030, clean policies can create around 24 million jobs in the renewable sector. Hence, in 
a context of moving from fossil fuels to renewable, it is relevant to investigate: (i) the 
effects of the elasticity of substitution between technologies – clean and dirty; (ii) the 
scale effects in the technological-knowledge bias, which, in turn, drives the skill 
premium and the relative return of renewable capital.  
The mechanism proposed – technological-knowledge bias – follows a model 
designed by Acemoglu (2002) and improved by Acemoglu et al. (2012). We contribute 
to this literature by building a general equilibrium endogenous growth model in which 
the aggregate final good can be produced either in the Clean or in the Dirty sector, being 
the substitutability between sectors flexible and, in line with the dominant literature on 
scale effects since Jones (1995a,b), they can be present or not. Thus, firms intend to 
maximize profits and consumers, the owners of firms, aim at maximize inter-temporal 
utility. Bearing in mind the connection between intermediate-goods production and the 
R&D sector, R&D directed to improving Clean intermediate goods can dominate. 
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We pretend to discuss the impact of both the degree of substitutability between 
technologies in production and the degree of scale effects on (i) wage inequality and on 
(ii) environmental quality. It is also possible to analyse the implications for economic 
growth. That is, our research questions are: what are the implications of endogenous 
technological-knowledge bias on the relative wages? How does the endogenous bias of 
the technological knowledge affect the relative return on renewable capital along the 
BGP? Moreover, we can still, if needed, answer the question: How is economic growth 
affected? 
Contrasting with the inspired models by Acemoglu (2002) and Adu (2012), our 
approach considers the environment, the endogenous rate and direction of the 
technological knowledge, the different equations of motions in R&D to address distinct 
productivities in each sector, and the implication of the market scale, measured by labor 
levels (Afonso, 2012). Moreover, we present a different formulation comparing 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) model. This model considers that the dirty input is produced 
using dirty-skilled labor and a natural exhaustible resource, while clean input only uses 
clean-skilled labor. Our framework, differently, was adapted and extended: there is 
complementarity between inputs and substitutability between sectors and thus the clean 
input is produced with clean-skilled labor and a clean resource, i.e., a renewable 
resource. 
According to the literature on the skill-biased technological change, the market-
size channel determines the technological-knowledge bias, which motivates wage 
inequality. Inspired by the literature on scale effects since Jones (1995a, b), the standard 
R&D technology is rewritten so that scale effects can be removed. In this case, wage 
inequality results similarly from technological-knowledge bias, which is instead driven 
by the price channel. According to Acemoglu et al. (2016), the discussion of some 
researches among the transition of dirty to clean technology, in order to propose a 
reduction of fossil fuels consumption and consequent limitation of CO2 emission, plays 
a relevant role. 
Scott et al. (2004), in turn, analyzed that human could influence (increase) the 
mean summer temperatures concerning a considerable part of Europe. Consequence of a 
higher sea surface temperatures, tropical cyclones in the Atlantic and western North 
Pacific cause destruction – see also, for example, Emanuel (2005) and Landsea (2005). 
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Others, considering empirical evidence, defend that transition as consequence of 
changes in prices and policies. 
Nordhaus (1994) suggests that technological progress and strict control is not 
sufficient to avoid the massive climate change, consequence of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the past. The effects of environmental policies in standard studies with 
exogenous technological knowledge provoke mostly two distinct outputs, which are not 
optimistic. Nordhaus (2007) suggests limited and slow interventions to decrease long-
run growth. In contrast, Stern (2009) proposes wide, stable and abrupt interventions, 
which comprise significant economic cost. 
Newel et al. (1999) defend policies that increase the price of oil comparatively to 
the price of natural gas, because they encourage energy efficiency. Popp (2002) shows 
that knowledge quality and energy prices affect positively innovation. More recently, 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) explain that a transition to cleaner technology can be a result of 
carbon taxes and subsidies in research combined. Acemoglu et al. (2016) go further and 
contemplate the optimal set of policies, expecting that carbon taxes give the big 
contributing due to the incentive of R&D in clean technology and reduction of 
emissions. As already stated, differently from Acemoglu et al. (2012), our model 
considers a renewable resource in the clean input production and lends much more 
flexibility to the technological-knowledge bias, allowing scale effects removal. In this 
case, the effects of the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty technologies as 
well as the effects of scale in the technological-knowledge bias, in the premium to 
human capital (clean-skilled labor) and in the relative return of renewable and fossil 
capital depend of the relative abundance of renewable capital. 
An economic model with two particular sectors was developed, which can be 
understood as our main contribution: the competitive dirty sector, which uses low-
skilled labor and a set of specific intermediate goods, produced under monopolistic 
competition, and the competitive clean sector, which uses high-skilled labor and a set of 
specific intermediate goods, also produced under monopolistic competition. The output 
of the Clean-Sector is produced with clean-skilled labor and a renewable capital. The 
output of the Dirty-Sector is produced with dirty-skilled labor natural capital and a 
continuum of labor and natural capital complementary machines. The rate and direction 
of the technological knowledge are both endogenous, emerging as a result of 
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competitive R&D activities, and then different scenarios are reproduced, according to 
different elasticity of substitution and the presence (or not) of scale effect.  
One of the main results of our model is related to the effect of de elasticity of 
substitution on technological-knowledge bias. When the factors utilized in both 
intermediate final good sectors are gross substitutes, an increase in relative abundance 
of clean-labor supply decreases the relative productivity of clean and dirty technologies. 
On the other hand, an increase in the relative abundance of renewable capital lends to an 
increase in the relative productivity of clean and dirty technologies. The direction of 
technological change is biased towards the clean sector if the economy is rich in 
renewable and clean-skilled capital. Regarding the premium to clean-skilled capital, the 
relative return on clean-skilled capital increases with the relative abundance of clean-
skilled in the case in which intermediate final good sectors are gross substitutes, and 
without scale effect. The abundance of natural capital increases wage inequality if the 
clean sector and the dirty sector are gross substitutes. Finally, the relative return to 
renewable capital increases in the relative abundance of clean skill if, in particular, the 
elasticity of substitution between relative abundance of clean-skilled and of renewable 
capital is greater than one. 
Overall, the model built is a two-sector model of directed technological change 
that can be complemented with more environmental parameters (for example, quality of 
environmental measures) and with its extension to two regions, allowing for trading 
between the different Economies. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline 
model of directed technological change (extension), the main assumptions and 
characterizes the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 describes the calibration of the 
model and shows simulated scenarios and quantitative results. Finally, section 4 
presents conclusions and several direction of future research. 
2. The Baseline Model 
Here, we describe the economic set-up, emphasizing the interactions among economic 
agents, and the general dynamic equilibrium in which (i) households and firms are 
rational (solving their problems), (ii) free-entry R&D conditions are met, and (iii) 
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markets clear. We start by considering the optimizing behavior of the infinitely-lived 
households that inelastically supply labor, clean-skilled or dirty-skilled, maximizes 
utility of consumption and invests in the firm's equity. Then, we describe the productive 
side, stressing the baseline maximization problem facing final-good firms, intermediate-
good firms and R&D firms. 
The inputs of the aggregate (composite, homogenous or consumption) final good 
(or numeraire) are two intermediate goods, each one composed by a large number of 
competitive firms: one is produced in the clean-skilled sector and the other is produced 
in the dirty-skilled sector, and each one uses specific labor and a continuum of specific 
non-durable intermediate goods. Each intermediate-goods sector consists of a 
continuum of industries; they are in monopolistic competition if the whole sector is 
considered: the monopolist in industry j uses a design, sold by the R&D sector 
(protected, domestically, by a perpetual patent), and aggregate final good to produce, at 
a price chosen to maximize profits, a non-durable intermediate good. That is, 
imperfectly competitive firms buy designs (technological knowledge) in the R&D 
sector to produce intermediate goods, which can complement the inputs used by 
perfectly competitive final-goods firms in either the clean-skilled sector or the dirty-
skilled sector. Therefore, the relative productivity of the technological knowledge 
depends on the sector in which it is employed. There is free entry in the perfectly 
competitive R&D sector free entry and every potential entrant dedicates aggregate final 
good to produce or invent successful horizontal designs. These designs can then be 
supplied to a new monopolist firm in a new intermediate-goods industry; that is, the 
R&D sector permits to surge the number of intermediate-goods industries 𝑵(𝒕) and thus 
the technological knowledge. 
 
2.1. Consumers 
We assume infinite-lived households deriving utility from consumption C and supply 
labor inelasticity. Two types of agents are considered among households, according to 
their competence working or not with “clean” machines: clean-skilled and dirty-skilled 
workers with, respectively, 𝐿𝐶 and 𝐿𝐷 aggregate supply. The representative household 
utility function, considering the populations constant, is: 
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 𝑈(𝐶) = ∫
𝐶1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
∞
0
𝑒−𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑡 (2.1) 
where 𝜃 is the rate of time preference and 𝜎 is theinverse of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution. For simplicity of exposition, the time argument in the utility function is 
suppressed. The aggregate flow budget constraint and the final product market 
equilibrium condition are equivalent, and the aggregate resource constraint of the 
economy is defined as follows:  
 Y ≥ 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝑍 (2.1) 
where 𝑌 stands for the aggregate output of the final good sector, 𝐼 for the total 
investment and 𝑍 for the total R&D expenditure. 
Following the no-Ponzi game condition, the lifetime budget constraint of the 
representative consumer must be satisfied. The asset accumulation equation is: 
 ?̇?  = 𝑟𝐵 +  𝛾 𝑤𝐷𝐿𝐷 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑤𝐶𝐿𝐶 − 𝐶 (2.2) 
where 𝐵 represents the total household assets and𝑟 the share of clean-skilled and dirty-
skilled workers in the households, 𝑤𝐶 is the wage for clean-skilled workers, 𝐿𝐶, and 𝑤𝐷 
is the wage for dirty-skilled workers, 𝐿𝐷. 
Consumption Euler equation is given by the intertemporal utility maximization 
problem (See the Appendix for calculations): 
 
?̇?
𝐶
=  
1
𝜎
 (𝑟 − 𝜌) (2.3) 
If the aggregate output and the consumption registry the same rate, the expression 
(2.4) reveals the aggregate growth rate at stead state. 
 
 
2.2. Final and intermediate goods production 
Two sectors in the country are considered: the clean sector and the dirty sector. The 
former is clean-skilled and renewable capital intensive, i.e. use non fossil fuels. The 
latter is dirty-skilled and natural capital intensive, i.e. use fossil fuels. Clean machines 
can only complement clean-skilled labor and renewable capital while dirty machines 
can complement dirty-skilled labor and natural capital. 
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The profit maximization problem will be solved according to final, intermediate 
and technology firms. In the model, 𝐾 is interpreted as the renewable capital and 𝑅 as 
the natural capital. 𝐿𝐶 represents the clean-skilled labor and 𝐿𝐷 the dirty-skilled labor. 
 
2.2.1. Maximization problem for final goods products 
The final good, which is unique, produced competitively using clean and dirty inputs, 
respectively, 𝑌𝐶 and 𝑌𝐷, has the followConstant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function: 
 𝑌 = [𝜍𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1
𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝜀−1
𝜀 ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
 (2.4) 
where 𝑌𝐷 isthe output of (input from) the dirty sector (D-Sector),𝑌𝐶 is the output of 
(input from) the clean sector (C-Sector) and ε ϵ (0, +∞) is the elasticity of substitution 
between the two sectors. If 𝜀 > (<)1 then the outputs of the D-Sector and the C-Sector 
are gross substitutes (complements). Normalizing the price of the final good at unit we 
get: 
[𝜍𝐷
𝜀 𝑃𝐷
1−𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶
𝜖𝑃𝐶
1−𝜀]
1
1−𝜀 = 1 
 
where [𝜍𝐷
𝜀 𝑃𝐷
1−𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶
𝜖𝑃𝐶
1−𝜀 ]
1
1−𝜀 is the unit cost of production. The maximization 
problem is given by: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋 = 𝑌 − 𝑃𝐷𝑌𝐷 − 𝑃𝐶 𝑌𝐶  
By first order condition we obtain, after some calculations, the relative price of 
the C-Sector (see appendix for 𝑃𝐶 and 𝑃𝐷 calculations): 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=  
[𝜍𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1
𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝜀−1
𝜀 ]
1
𝜀−1
𝜍𝐶 𝑌𝐶
−
1
𝜀
[𝜍𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1
𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝜀−1
𝜀 ]
1
𝜀−1
𝜍𝐷 𝑌𝐷
−
1
𝜀
 
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=
𝜍𝐶
𝜍𝐷
(
𝑌𝐶
𝑌𝐷
)
− 
1
𝜀
 (2.5) 
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2.2.2. Maximization problem for intermediate final goods producers 
The output of the D-Sector is produced with dirty-skilled labor, natural capital and a 
continuum of labor and natural capital complementary machines 𝑥𝐷 in the [0, 𝐴𝐷] 
interval. The production function for the D-Sector is given by: 
 𝑌𝐷 =  
𝐿𝐷
𝛼𝑅𝛽
1 −  𝛼 −  𝛽
∫ 𝑥𝐷
𝐴𝐷
0
(𝑖)1−𝛼−𝛽 𝑑𝑖 (2.6) 
Similarly, the production function for the C-Sector is: 
 𝑌𝐶 =  
𝐿𝐶
𝛼𝐾𝛽
1 −  𝛼 −  𝛽
∫ 𝑥𝐶
𝐴𝐶
0
(𝑖)1−𝛼−𝛽 (2.7) 
where 𝐴𝐷 captures the states of the D-Sector complementary technologies and 𝐴𝐶  
captures the state of the C-Sector complementary technologies. Maximization problem 
in the D-Sector: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝜋𝐷 =  𝑃𝐷 𝑌𝐷 −  𝑤𝐷𝐿𝐷 −  𝑃𝑅𝑅 −  ∫ 𝑞𝐷(𝑖)𝑥𝐷(𝑖) 𝑑𝑖
𝐴𝐷
0
 
where 𝑃𝑅  is the prices of natural capital (𝑅) and𝑞𝐷 is the D-Sector complementary 
machines. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝜋𝐷 =  
𝐿𝐷
𝛼𝑅𝛽
1 −  𝛼 −  𝛽
∫ 𝑥𝐷
𝐴𝐷
0
(𝑖)1−𝛼−𝛽 𝑑𝑖 −  𝑤𝐷𝐿𝐷 −  𝑃𝑅𝑅 − ∫ 𝑞𝐷 
𝐴𝐷
0
(𝑖)𝑥𝐷(𝑖)𝑑𝑖 
From the first order conditions results: 
𝜕𝜋𝐷
𝜕𝐿𝐷
= 0 
𝑃𝐷
𝛼 𝐿𝐷
𝛼−1𝑅𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
∫ 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝐴𝐷
0
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑤𝐷 = 0 
 
 𝛼
𝑃𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝐿𝐷
 − 𝑤𝐷 = 0 (2.8) 
𝜕𝜋𝐷
𝜕𝑅
= 0 
𝑃𝐷
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝛽𝑅𝛽−1
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
∫ 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝐴𝐷
0
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑃𝑅 = 0 
 
  𝛽 
𝑃𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝑅
 − 𝑃𝑅 = 0 (2.9) 
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𝜕𝜋𝐷
𝜕𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
= 0 
𝑃𝐷
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
−𝛼−𝛽−𝑞𝐷(𝑖) = 0 (Leibniz integral rue) 
 𝑃𝐷 𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
−(𝛼+𝛽) −  𝑞𝐷 (𝑖) = 0 (2.10) 
Rearranging equation (2.11) we attain the demand for machine type i used in the 
D-Sector: 
𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
−(𝛼+𝛽) =  
𝑞𝐷 (𝑖)
𝑃𝐷 𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽
 
 𝑥𝐷(𝑖) = [
𝑃𝐷
𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.11) 
   
We assume that only one type of machine is used in each intermediate good firm 
(Adu, 2012). Thus, combining (2.12), (2.9) and (2.10) we get the inverse demand 
functions for labor and natural inputs in the D-Sector: 
 𝑤𝐷 =   
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 [
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
]
− 
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.12) 
Similarly: 
 𝑃𝑅 =
𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 [
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
]
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.13) 
The maximization problem in the C-Sector is given by: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝜋𝐶 =  𝑃𝐶𝑌𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶 𝐿𝐶 − 𝑃𝐾𝐾 −  ∫ 𝑞𝐶(𝑖)𝑥𝐶(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
𝐴𝐶
0
 
where 𝑃𝐶 is the prices of physical capital (𝐾) and𝑞𝐶 is theC-Sector complementary 
machines. From the first order conditions: 
𝜕𝜋𝐶
𝜕𝐿𝐶
=
𝛼 𝑃𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝐿𝐶
− 𝑤𝐶 = 0 
𝜕𝜋𝐶
𝜕𝐾
=
𝛽 𝑃𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝐾
− 𝑃𝐾 = 0 
𝜕𝜋𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝐶(𝑖)
= 𝑃𝐶𝐿𝐶
𝛼𝐾𝛽𝑥𝐶 (𝑖)
−(𝛼+𝛽) − 𝑞𝐶(𝑖) = 0 
Similarly to the previous proof proposition, 
 
𝑥𝐶 (𝑖) = [
𝑃𝐶
𝑞𝐶(𝑖)
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝐾𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽
 
(2.14) 
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 𝑤𝐶 =  
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝐶(𝑖)
− 
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 [
𝐿𝐶
𝐾
]
−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.15) 
 
 𝑃𝐾 =  
𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝐶(𝑖)
− 
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 [
𝐿𝐶
𝐾
]
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.16) 
 
2.2.3. Maximization problem facing innovators 
Regarding the profit maximization problem facing innovators, the machines price, 𝑞(𝑖), 
is chosen by the innovator in order to maximize profits. The marginal cost of building a 
machine, given by χ, is the same across sectors. Thus, the innovator sells machines at 
the monopoly price according to the maximization of the profit subject to the demand 
for machines. The maximization problem for the D-Sector is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝜋𝐷1 = 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)[𝑞𝐷(𝑖) −  𝜒] 
m𝑎𝑥. 𝜋𝐷1 = 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)[𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
−(𝛼+𝛽) −  𝜒] 
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝜋𝐷1 = 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
1−𝛼−𝛽𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽 − 𝑥𝐷(𝑖) 𝜒 
𝜕𝜋𝐷1
𝜕𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
= 0 
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽). 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
−(𝛼+𝛽)𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽 − 𝜒 = 0 
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽). 𝑞𝐷(𝑖) =  𝜒 
𝑞𝐷(𝑖) =  
𝜒
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
 
Similarly, for the maximization problem on the C-Sector 
 
𝑞𝐶(𝑖) =  
𝜒
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
 (2.17) 
Without loss of generality, and according to Acemoglu (2002), it will be assumed 
thatχ = 1 − α − β. 
 
2.3. Equilibrium Conditions 
We consider constant technology combining expressions (2.18), (2.12) and (2.15), we 
obtain the demand for machines in the two sectors:  
 
 
11 
 𝑥𝐷(𝑖) = [𝑃𝐷𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽 (2.18) 
 
 𝑥𝐶(𝑖) = [𝑃𝐶𝐿𝐶
𝛼 𝐾𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽 (2.19) 
We can rewrite the production function for the intermediate sectors combining 
equations (2.19), (2.20), (2.7) and (2.8): 
 
𝑌𝐷 =  
𝐿𝐷
𝛼+1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑅𝛽+1−𝛼−𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
(1−𝛼−𝛽)
1
𝛼+𝛽𝐿𝐷
𝛼 
1
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑅
𝛽 
1
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
 
𝑌𝐷 =  
𝐿𝐷
1−𝛽
𝑅1−𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
[𝑃𝐷
(1−𝛼−𝛽)𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽 
 𝑌𝐷 =  
𝐴𝐷
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
[𝑃𝐷
(1−𝛼−𝛽)𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽 (2.20) 
 
 𝑌𝐶 =  
𝐴𝐶
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
[𝑃𝐶
(1−𝛼−𝛽)𝐿𝐶
𝛼 𝐾𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽 (2.21) 
Rewriting expressions (2.13), (2.14), (2.16) and (2.17), knowing that qI =
 
χ
1−α−β
= 1, we obtain the inverse demand function for R:  
 𝑃𝑅 =  
𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.22) 
 
the inverse demand function for labor D-Sector: 
 𝑊𝐷 =  
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
)
−
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.23) 
 
the inverse demand function for labor C-Sector: 
 𝑊𝐶 =  
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐶
𝐾
)
−
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.24) 
 
and the inverse demand function for K: 
 𝑃𝐾 =  
𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐶
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 (2.25) 
The profit of technology monopolist in the D-Sector is given by: 
 𝜋𝐷 = (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝐿𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑅
1
𝛼+𝛽 (2.26) 
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and similarly,  
 𝜋𝐶 = (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽𝐿𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽𝐾
1
𝛼+𝛽 (2.27) 
By substituting equations (2.21) and (2.22) into (2.6), it’s possible to obtain the 
relative price of the C-Factor (see Appendix for deduction): 
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜎 [(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
]−
1
𝜎 (2.28) 
where 𝜎 = 1 + (𝜀 − 1)(𝛼 + 𝛽) represents the elasticity of substitution between relative 
abundance of clean-skilled and of renewable capital. It is important to point out that 𝜍 =
𝜍𝐶
𝜍𝐷
 and if 𝜀 > 1, 𝜎 > 1 (and vice versa).  We can say that the relative price of C-Sector 
output decreases according to the relative abundance of clean-skilled labor 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
 and the 
relative bias of technology. Nevertheless, it increases in the relative abundance of 
natural capital (
𝑅
𝐾
).Combining equations (2.24), (2.25) and (2.29), we obtain the relative 
return on clean-skilled capital: 
 
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
=   [𝜍 –𝜀  (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
 
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)
𝛼+𝛽
]
− 
1
𝜎
 (2.29) 
Dividing equation (2.26) by (2.23) and combining the resulting equation and 
equation (2.29), we obtain the relative return of physical capital to natural capital: 
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
=   [𝜍 –𝜀  (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
) (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−
𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽+𝛼𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
 (2.30) 
We obtain the relative profitability of innovators in the C-Sector dividing equation 
(2.28) by (2.27) and combining the resulting equation and equation (2.29): 
 𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(−
1
𝜎
)
[(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 
]
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 
(2.31) 
Here it is relevant to denote de 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
role, capable to allow higher profits in the sector with 
higher price. 
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2.4. Directed technological change 
Now, we analyze how the results of the model are affected by considering that the rate 
and the direction of the technological knowledge are both endogenous. In the perfectly 
competitive R&D sector there is free entry and each potential entrant devotes aggregate 
final good to produce a successful design, which is protected by a system of patents and 
allows the introduction of a new intermediate good; i.e., a new firm in a new industry n. 
Innovation is revealed by the introduction of new varieties of intermediate inputs with 
either complements clean-skilled labor (𝐿𝐶) and renewable capital (𝐾) or dirty-skilled 
labor (𝐿𝐷) and natural capital (𝑅). According to Acemoglu (2002, 2008), technologies 
that complement the dirty and clear sectors change over the time according to the 
following equations of motions: 
𝐴?̇? = 𝜆𝐶𝑍𝐶𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶  
 𝐴?̇? = 𝜆𝐷𝑍𝐷𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷  (2.33) 
Where𝜆𝐶and 𝜆𝐷 are the productivities of the R&D activity in j-sector and we assume 
that 𝜆𝐶 > 𝜆𝐷. Moreover, 𝑍𝐶and 𝑍𝐷representthe R&D expenditure directed at 
discovering, respectively, a new C-sector and a new D-sector augmenting machines. 
Given that scale effects are often considered implausible (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b), 𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶  
and 𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷 , implies that an increase in market scale, measured by labor levels weakens 
the effect of R&D outlays on the innovation rate due to coordination, organizational and 
transportation costs related to market size (e.g., Afonso, 2012), which, as we can see 
below, can partially (0 < 𝛾𝐿𝐶, 𝛾𝐿𝐷 < 1), totally (𝛾𝐿𝐶 =  𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 1) or over counterbalance 
(𝛾𝐿𝐶, 𝛾𝐿𝐷 > 1) the scale benefits on profits and thus allows us to remove scale effects on 
the economic growth rate, in contrast with the typical knife-edge hypothesis that either 
𝛾𝐿𝐶, 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 0 or 𝛾𝐿𝐶, 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 1 (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 6).Therefore, total 
R&D expenditure (𝑍) satisfies 
𝑍 = 𝑍𝐶 + 𝑍𝐷 . 
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman conditions for the value function of a technology 
monopolist that discovers one of these machines satisfies: 
𝑅𝑉𝑗(𝑖) − 𝑉?̇?(𝑖) = 𝜋𝑗(𝑖), 𝑗 = 𝐷, 𝐶 
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The instantaneous profits for sector 𝑗 = 𝐷, 𝐶 are specified, respectively, in (2.27) 
and (2.28) and 𝑟 is the market interest rate.1 Since along the balanced growth path 
(BGP), the interest rate is constant and 𝑉?̇?(𝑖) = 0,  
𝑉𝐷 =
𝜋𝐷
𝑟
 
 𝑉𝐶 =
𝜋𝐶
𝑟
 (2.34) 
where, remember, 𝐴𝐷 and 𝐴𝐶  do not grow at the same rate at each t doubtlessly; this 
implies that innovators are not indifferent between the sector where they innovate. In 
particular, remember, 𝜆𝐶 > 𝜆𝐷, but bearing in mind the free entry condition along the 
BGP combined with equations (2.32) and (2.29), the relative value for the technology 
monopolist in the C-Sector is (see Appendix): 
 𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐷
∗ =
𝜆𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
=
𝜋𝐶
∗
𝜋𝐷
∗ = 𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(−
1
𝜎
)
[(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 
]
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 (2.35) 
Some aspects could be pointed about the relative profitability of technologies 
related to C-Sector. Indeed, in the case of 𝜎 > 1, there will be an increase in the 
profitability in the relative abundance of clean-skilled capital and will decrease in the 
relative abundance of natural capital. 
Therefore, see Appendix in order to verify the ratio 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
 deduction: 
 𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
= 𝜍
𝜀
(1+𝜎) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
𝜎
(1+𝜎)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 (𝜎−1)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 (𝜎−1)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
 (2.36) 
Expression (2.36) represents the relative productivity of Clean and Dirty 
technologies and is the key result of the directed technical change literature. Moreover, 
in our case is the measure of environmental quality. In the standard directed technical 
change literature (e.g., Acemoglu 1998, 2002, 2008), the scale has no impact on R&D 
technology; i.e., scale effects are not removed, 𝛾𝐿𝐶, 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 0, and the market-size 
channel, through which technologies using the more profuse labor type are favored, 
dominates the chain of effects. In our case, however, the level of scale effects removal 
lends much more flexibility to the technological-knowledge bias. Thus, 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
 variation if 
some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, accordingly 𝜎 position, as show the Table 1. 
                                                     
1 In order to simplify the notation, time arguments were dropped. 
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𝜎 0 0 < 𝜎 < 1 1 > 1 
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
 0 >0 >0 >0 
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
 <0 <0 0 >0 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
 >0 >0 0 <0 
𝐾
𝑅
 <0 <0 0 >0 
Table 1. Relative productivity of Clean and Dirty technologies variation if some ratios have a 
variation of 1 unit, accordingly σ position 
 
Proposition 1. The direction of technological change is endogenized and when 𝜎 > 1, 
an increase in 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
 will decrease 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
 for a given 
𝐾
𝑅
. When 𝜎 > 1, an increase in 
𝐾
𝑅
 will 
increase 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
 for a given 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
, thus improving the environmental quality. Moreover, if the 
economy is rich, by assumption, in renewable and clean-skilled capital, the direction of 
technological change becomes biased towards the C-sector, cleansing the environment. 
When 𝜎 < 1, an increase in 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
 will increase 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
 for a given 
𝐾
𝑅
 and when 𝜎 < 1, an 
increase in 
𝐾
𝑅
 will decrease 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
 for a given 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
. 
 
Proof. Directly from equation (2.36). 
 
Bearing in mind (2.36), we are able to analyze the implications of endogenous 
technological-knowledge bias on the relative wage, since, by complementarity between 
factors in (2.5), changes in wage inequality are tightly connected to the technological-
knowledge bias (see equation (2.30)). Hence, we substitute (2.36) into (2.30), we have 
the skill premium that can be interpreted as the relative return on clean-skilled capital 
(see Appendix for deduction): 
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𝑊 ≡
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
= [𝜍(
−𝜎𝜀 
1+𝜎
) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)(1+1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 
 
(2.37) 
From equation (2.37), 𝑊 variation if some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, 
accordingly 𝜎 position, as it is shown in the Table 2. 
 
𝜎 0 < 𝜎 < 1 𝜎 = 1 𝜎 > 1 
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
 <0 <0 <0 
𝐾
𝑅
 >0 =0 <0 
Table 2. Wages ratio variation if some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, accordingly σ position 
 
Regarding the impact of the ratio 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
, we need to consider the different possibilities 
of scale effect, as it is represented on the Table 3. 
 
 
0 < 𝜎 < 1 𝜎 = 1 𝜎 > 1 
𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 0 <0 <0 <0 
0 < 𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 < 1 <0 <0 >0 
𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 1 <0 <0 >0 
𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 > 1 <0 <0 >0 
Table 3. Wages ratio variation if some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, according to scale effect 
assumption 
 
Proposition 2. Considering 𝛾 = 𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷, the expression (2.37) could be rewritten: 
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𝑊 = [𝜍(
−𝜎𝜀 
1+𝜎
) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛾 𝛼(𝜎−1)+(𝛼+𝛽𝜎)(1+ 𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)(1+1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 
Thus, the relative return on human capital increases in the relative abundance of clean-
skilled if σ > 1andγLC = γLD > 0. The relative return on clean-skilled capital will 
increase in the relative abundance of natural capital if σ > 1. Therefore, if the clean and 
dirty sectors are gross substitutes in the final good, then the abundance of natural capital 
increases the wage inequality. 
 
Proof. Directly from equation (2.37). 
 
Then, in order to examine how the endogenous bias of the technological 
knowledge affects the relative return on 𝐾 along the BGP, we substitute equation (2.36) 
into expression (2.31), which can be interpreted as a domestic exchange rate between 𝑅, 
natural capital, and 𝐾, renewable capital, or the relative price of K: 
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= [𝜍
−𝜎𝜀
1+ 𝜎 (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝛼−1)+(𝛽+𝛼𝜎)(1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 (2.38) 
From equation (2.38), 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
 variation if some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, 
accordingly 𝜎 position, as it is exposed in the Table 4. 
 
𝜎 0 < 𝜎 < 1 𝜎 = 1 𝜎 > 1 
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
 <0 <0 <0 
𝐾
𝑅
 <0 <0 <0 
Table 4. Relative return on K variation if some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, accordingly σ 
position 
Once again, regarding the impact of the ratio 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
, it is necessary to consider the 
different possibilities of scale effect, as it is represented on the Table 5. 
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 0 < 𝜎 < 1 𝜎 = 1 𝜎 > 1 
𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 0 <0 =0 >0 
0 < 𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 < 1 <0 =0 >0 
𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 = 1 <0 =0 >0 
𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷 > 1 <0 =0 >0 
Table 5. Relative return on K variation if some ratios have a variation of 1 unit, according to 
scale effect assumption 
 
Proposition 3. Considering 𝛾 = 𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷, the expression (2.38) could be rewritten: 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= [𝜍
−𝜎𝜀
1+ 𝜎 (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛾𝛼(𝜎−1)−𝛼(𝜎−1)(1+ 𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝛼−1)+(𝛽+𝛼𝜎)(1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 
The relative return to renewable capital rises in the relative abundance of clean-skilled 
whenever 𝜎 > 1. The relative return to renewable capital will not increase in the 
relative abundance of natural capital. 
 
Proof. Directly from equation (2.38). 
 
An additional and alternative measure of environmental quality could have been 
considered, based on the ratio between the production in the clean sector and in the dirty 
sector. Putting together (2.21) and (2.22), and taking into account expressions (2.29) 
and (2.36) one gets: 
 
𝑌𝐶
𝑌𝐷
= 𝜍
𝜀𝜎(2−𝛼−𝛽)
(1+𝜎) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽−𝜎
(1+𝜎)
(
𝐿𝐶
(1+𝜎)+(𝜎−1)𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
(1+𝜎)+(𝜎−1)𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
−
𝛼(1−𝛼−𝛽−𝜎)
𝜎(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
−
(1−𝛼−𝛽−𝜎)𝛽 (𝛼−1)
𝜎(𝛼+𝛽)
 
(2.36) 
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3. Quantitative results 
In this section, we examine quantitatively the sensitivity of the principal 
macroeconomic aggregate ratios of the model to different values for the elasticity of 
substitution between clean and dirty sectors, given by𝜀, and the scale effects, given by 
𝛾 = 𝛾𝐿𝐶 = 𝛾𝐿𝐷. 
 
3.1. Calibration 
For the quantitative results, we have to set, besides 𝜀 and 𝛾, parameters 𝛼 (the share of  
labor -clean and dirty - in the intermediate goods production), 𝛽 (the share of renewable 
and natural capital in the intermediate goods production), 𝜍𝐶 and 𝜍𝐷 (the distribution or 
intensity parameter combined  to productivity or efficiency of clean and dirty sector, 
respectively), 𝐿𝐶 and 𝐿𝐷 (the force employed in the clean and dirty sector, respectively), 
𝐾 (the renewable capital or non-fossil fuels),  𝑅 (the natural capital or fossil fuels), 𝜆𝐶 
and 𝜆𝐷 (the productivities of the E&D activities in the clean and dirty sector, 
respectively). We set typical values for 𝛼 = 0.6and 𝛽 = 0.01.  
Regarding 𝜍𝐶 and 𝜍𝐷, we assume that the ratio between 𝜍𝐶 and 𝜍𝐷, given by 𝜍, is 6, 
a value higher than 1 that we consider plausible justified by a productivity or efficiency 
in clean sector higher than in dirty sector. For the ratio 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
 we use a value lower than 1, 
following the empirical fact of the lower force employed in the clean sector comparing 
the force employed in the dirty sector. For the ratio 
𝐾
𝑅
 we assume as 0.14, a lower value 
defensible taking in account the lower renewable resources used in the production 
comparing fossil fuels. Finally, it is acceptable that the ratio between the productivities 
of the R&D activities in both sectors, 
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
, is 1.5 (higher than 1). Table 6 summarizes our 
calibrated values. 
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Parameters Values 
𝛼 0.6 
𝛽 0.01 
𝜍 6 
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
 0.5 
𝐾
𝑅
 0.14 
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
 1.5 
Table 6. Parameters calibrated 
 
3.2. Results 
In this section we pretend evaluate how elasticity of substitution between clean and 
dirty goods, 𝜀, and the presence or not of the scale effect, 𝛾, could influence the main 
ratios of this directed technical change. 
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Figure 1. Main ratios for different elasticities of substitution and scale effects 
 
One of the main results of our model is related to the effect of de elasticity of 
substitution on technological-knowledge bias. Due to the calibration made, considering 
the absence of scale effects, the variation of the elasticity of substitution between inputs 
in both sectors will increase the ratio 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
, which is a measure of environmental quality; 
i.e., as the 𝜀 increases and both intermediate final good sectors are being more gross 
substitutes, it favors the technological-knowledge directed towards the C-Sector in the 
production of intermediate final goods, as we can observe on Figure 1A. The impact of 
the existence of scale effect could be seen on Figure 1B, and we conclude that the 
increase of the technological-knowledge bias towards the clean sector is lower under 
scale effects, but the trend is however maintained. 
Regarding wage premium, Figure 1C shows that, without scale effect, while both 
intermediate final good sectors are complement, the wage inequality decreases 
significantly, inverting the trend when elasticity of substitution increases and 
intermediate final good sectors become substitutes. Once again, with scale effects the 
impact on wage premium is lower than without scale effects, but the trend is maintained 
(Figure 1D). This result is expected since the technological-knowledge bias affects the 
wage inequality – see, for example, equation (2.30). Indeed, when the two sectors are 
strong substitutes, the technological-knowledge is more biased and because of that also 
the wage inequality increases; i.e., if sectors are strong substitutable, the technological-
knowledge bias is more accentuated and thus the productivity of labor in the clean 
sector increases more. In turn, if sectors are complements, they are both needed in 
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production of the aggregate output and then an increase in the wage in the clean sector 
requires a greater increase in the wage in the dirty sector. 
Now, comparing the two scenarios for the relative price of the renewable capital, 
with and without scale effects (Figures 1F and 1E), the simulation presents a similar 
behavior due to the same mechanisms. If the both intermediate final good sectors are 
complement, the ratio of prices will decrease drastically but if they become substitutes 
the relative price of the renewable sector will increase. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
We wanted to examine how both the degree of substitutability between technologies in 
production and the degree of scale effects could impact on wage inequality and on 
environmental quality, using for that a directed technical change approach between two 
sectors (clean and dirty). 
A directed technical change endogenous growth model was developed in which 
the aggregate final good can be produced either in the Clean or in the Dirty sector, with 
distinct elasticity of substitutability between sectors. Moreover, we also consider 
different degrees of scale effects. We endogenized the rate and the direction of the 
technological knowledge, as a result of competitive R&D activities. We conclude that 
the technological-knowledge bias towards the Clean sector explains the improvement of 
the environmental quality, which arises, for example, when the economy is rich in 
renewable and clean-skilled capital. 
Moreover, the elasticity of substitution influences the technological-knowledge 
bias. We can elucidate that if relative abundance of clean-labor supply increase, the 
relative productivity of clean and dirty technologies will decrease in the case of the 
factors used in both intermediate final good sectors are gross substitutes. When the 
relative abundance of renewable capital increases, consequently the relative 
productivity of clean and dirty technologies increases. Economies rich in renewable and 
clean-skilled capital assist to the direction of technological change biased towards the 
clean sector, which is a good sign for the environment quality.  
The variation of the elasticity of substitution between inputs in both sectors plays 
an important role because a positive variation will increase the technological-knowledge 
bias, what means that if intermediate final good sectors are being more gross 
substitutes, it favors the technological-knowledge directed towards the Clean sector in 
the production of intermediate final goods. 
Analyzed the premium to clean-skilled capital implications, we conclude that the 
relative return on clean-skilled capital increases with the relative abundance of clean-
skilled in the case in which intermediate final good sectors are gross substitutes, and 
without scale effect. The abundance of natural capital increases wage inequality if the 
clean sector and the dirty sector are gross substitutes. Without scale effect, the wage 
inequality decreases if intermediate final good sectors are complement, inverting the 
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trend when elasticity of substitution increases and intermediate final good sectors 
become substitutes, an expected result since the technological-knowledge bias affects 
the wage inequality. 
The relative return to renewable capital increases in the relative abundance of 
clean skill if, in particular, the elasticity of substitution between relative abundance of 
clean-skilled and of renewable capital is greater than one.  
In our approach, the environmental well as the endogenous rate and direction of 
the technological knowledge are considered. However, it is still limited and should be 
extended in future research. In particular, it can be complemented with more 
environmental parameters (for example, quality of environmental measures) and with 
its extension to two regions, allowing for trading between the different Economies. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Consumption Euler Equation 
From the current value Hamiltonian 
𝐻 = (
𝐶1−𝜎 − 1
1 − 𝜎
) +  𝜆[𝑟𝐵 +  𝛾𝑤𝐷𝐿𝐷 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑤𝐶𝐿𝐶 − 𝐶] 
Derivations are made as follows: 
 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝐶
=  𝐶−𝜎 −  𝜆 = 0 
𝐶−𝜎  = 𝜆 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝐵
=  𝜆 𝑟 =  𝜌 𝜆 −  ?̇? 
?̇? = (𝜌 − 𝑟)𝜆 
Derivation of 
𝜕𝐻 
𝜕𝐶
 in order to 𝑡, the time, yields 
−𝜎 𝐶−𝜎−1?̇? =  ?̇? 
Thus, 
−𝜎 𝐶−𝜎−1?̇? = (𝜌 − 𝑟) 𝜆 
−𝜎 𝐶−𝜎𝐶−1?̇? = (𝜌 − 𝑟)𝐶−𝜎 
 
?̇?
𝐶
=
1
𝜎
 (𝑟 − 𝜌) (A.32) 
 
B. Final good prices in the two sectors 
The maximization problem is given by: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋 = 𝑌 − 𝑃𝐷𝑌𝐷 − 𝑃𝐶 𝑌𝐶  
π = [ςDYD
ε−1
ε +  ςCYC
ε−1
ε ]
ε
ε−1
 −  PDYD − PC YC 
Derivation is made: 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑌𝐷 
=
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
[𝜍𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1
𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝜀−1
𝜀 ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
 −1
𝜀 − 1 
𝜀
𝜍𝐷 𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1 
𝜀
 −1
− 𝑃𝐷 = 0 
and the price of the final good in the D-Sector is obtained: 
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 𝑃𝐷 = [𝜍𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1
𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝜀−1
𝜀 ]
1
𝜀−1
𝜍𝐷 𝑌𝐷
−
1
𝜀 (A.2) 
Similarly, 
 𝑃𝐶 =  [𝜍𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝜀−1
𝜀 +  𝜍𝐶𝑌𝐶
𝜀−1
𝜀 ]
1
𝜀−1
𝜍𝐶 𝑌𝐶
−
1
𝜀 (A.3) 
 
 
C. Inverse demand for labor derivation 
The demand for the demand for machine type i used in the D-Sector is given by: 
𝑥𝐷(𝑖) = [
𝑃𝐷
𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝛼 𝑃𝐷𝑌𝐷
𝐿𝐷
=  𝑤𝐷 
𝑤𝐷 =  𝛼 𝑃𝐷 
1
𝐿𝐷
 
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
∫ 𝑥𝐷(𝑖)
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝐴𝐷
0
 𝑑𝑖 
𝑤𝐷
=  𝛼 𝑃𝐷 
1
𝐿𝐷
𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽
1
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
∫ 𝑃𝐷
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
𝐴𝐷
0
𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 𝐿𝐷
𝛼(1−𝛼−𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽 𝑅
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽 𝑑𝑖 
𝑤𝐷 =   
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1+
(1−𝛼−𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽 𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 𝐿𝐷
−1+𝛼+ 
𝛼(1−𝛼−𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽 𝑅
𝛽+
𝛽(1−𝛼−𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽 𝑑𝑖 
𝑤𝐷 =   
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 𝐿𝐷
− 
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽𝑅
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 
 𝑤𝐷 =   
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝐷(𝑖)
−
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽 [
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
]
− 
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 (A.4) 
 
D. The relative price of the C-Factor deduction 
  
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=  
𝜍𝐶
𝜍𝐷
[
𝑌𝐶
𝑌𝐷
]
− 
1
𝜀
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𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=  
𝜍𝐶
𝜍𝐷
[
𝐴𝐶
1−𝛼−𝛽
[𝑃𝐶
(1−𝛼−𝛽)𝐿𝐶
𝛼𝐾𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽
𝐴𝐷
1−𝛼−𝛽
[𝑃𝐷
(1−𝛼−𝛽)𝐿𝐷
𝛼 𝑅𝛽]
1
𝛼+𝛽
]
− 
1
𝜀
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=  
𝜍𝐶
𝜍𝐷
(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
− 
1
𝜀
(
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
(1−𝛼−𝛽)
1
𝛼+𝛽
(− 
1
𝜀
)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
1
𝛼+𝛽
(− 
1
𝜀
)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
1
𝛼+𝛽
(− 
1
𝜀
)
 
(
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
(1−𝛼−𝛽)
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
1
𝜀
)+ 
𝜀
𝜀
=   𝜍 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
− 
1
𝜀
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
1
𝛼+𝛽
(− 
1
𝜀
)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 
1
𝛼+𝛽
(− 
1
𝜀
)
 
(
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
(1−𝛼−𝛽)
1
𝛼+𝛽
+ 𝜀
=   𝜍 𝜀 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
− 1
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
− 𝛼
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
− 𝛽 
1
𝛼+𝛽
 
(
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
(1−𝛼−𝛽) + 𝜀 (𝛼+𝛽)
𝛼+𝛽
=   𝜍 𝜀 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
− 1
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
− 
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
−  
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
= 𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
1+(𝜀−1)(𝛼+𝛽) (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
− 
𝛼+𝛽
1+(𝜀−1)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
− 
𝛼(𝛼 +𝛽)
(𝛼+𝛽)+1+(𝜀−1)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
−  
𝛽(𝛼 +𝛽)
(𝛼+𝛽)+1+(𝜀−1)(𝛼+𝛽)
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
= 𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
− 
𝛼+𝛽
𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
− 
𝛼
𝜎
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
−  
𝛽
𝜎
 
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜎 [(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
]−
1
𝜎 (A.5) 
 
E. The relative return on clean-skilled capital deduction 
𝑊 =
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
=
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽𝐿𝐶
−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽𝐾
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽𝐿𝐷
−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽𝑅
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
= (
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜎
1
𝛼+𝛽[(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
 
 
 
 
28 
 
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
=   [𝜍 –𝜀  (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
 
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)
𝛼+𝛽
]
− 
1
𝜎
 (A.6) 
 
F. The relative return of physical capital to natural capital deduction 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
=
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐶
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= (
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝑅
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= 𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜎
1
𝛼+𝛽 [(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝑅
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
=   𝜍 –𝜀 (−
1
𝜎
) (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
−
1
𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼−𝛼𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽+𝛼𝜎)
𝛼+𝛽
(−
1
𝜎
)
 
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
=   [𝜍 –𝜀  (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
) (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−
𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽+𝛼𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
 (A.7) 
 
G. The relative profitability of innovators in the C-Sector deduction 
𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
=
(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑃𝐶
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐶
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑃𝐷
1
𝛼+𝛽 (
𝐿𝐷
𝑅
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
= (
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐷
)
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝑅
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
𝜎
1
𝛼+𝛽 [(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
1
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝑅
𝐾
)
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 
𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
1
𝜎
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
1
𝜎
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 𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
=   𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(−
1
𝜎
)
[(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 
]
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 
(A.8) 
 
H. The relative profitability of innovators in the C-Sector deduction and the 
relative productivity of Clean and Dirty technologies with directed technological 
change 
𝐴?̇?
𝐴𝐷
=
𝐴?̇?
𝐴𝐶
 
𝜆𝐷𝑍𝐷𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
𝐴𝐷
=
𝜆𝐶𝑍𝐶𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐴𝐶
 
𝑍𝐶
𝑍𝐷
=
𝜆𝐷
𝜆𝐶
∗
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
∗
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
 
𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐷
=
𝑍𝐶
𝑍𝐷
=
𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
 
𝜆𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
=
𝜋𝐶
𝜋𝐷
 
 𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐷
∗ =
𝜆𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
=
𝜋𝐶
∗
𝜋𝐷
∗ = 𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(−
1
𝜎
)
[(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 
]
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 (A.9) 
𝜆𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
= 𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(
1
𝜎
)
=
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 
(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
1
𝜎
+1
= 𝜍 
𝜀
𝜎
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 
(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
= 𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎 (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽
𝜎−1
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
 
(
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
= 𝜍 𝜀(𝛼+𝛽) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 (𝜎−1)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 (𝜎−1) 
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𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
= 𝜍 
𝜀(𝛼+𝛽)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(𝛼+𝛽)𝜎
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 (𝜎−1)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 (𝜎−1)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
 
 
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
= 𝜍 
𝜀
(1+𝜎) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
𝜎
(1+𝜎)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼 (𝜎−1)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽 (𝜎−1)
(1+𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
 
 
(A.10) 
 
I. The skill premium deduction with directed technical change 
𝑊 ≡
𝑤𝐶
𝑤𝐷
= [𝜍 −𝜀 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
) (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)
𝛼+𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
 
𝑊
= 𝜍–𝜀(−
1
𝜎
) [(
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
𝜍
𝜀
1+ 𝜎 (
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)
(𝛼+𝛽)
(−
1
𝜎
)
 
𝑊
= 𝜍(−
1
𝜎
)(–𝜀+ 
𝜀
1+ 𝜎
) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
−
1
𝜎
(
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
−
1
𝜎
(
𝛽(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
+
𝛽(1−𝜎)
(𝛼+𝛽)
)
 
 
𝑊 = 𝜍(−
1
𝜎
)(
−𝜎 
1+𝜎
) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
−
1
𝜎
(
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(−
1
𝜎
)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
−
1
𝜎
(
𝛽(1−𝜎)(1+1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
)
 
 
𝑊 = [𝜍(
−𝜎𝜀 
1+𝜎
) (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
)
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼+𝛽𝜎
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(1−𝜎)(1+1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 
 
(A.11) 
J. The relative return on renewable capital with directed technical change 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= [𝜍 −𝜀 (
𝐴𝐶
𝐴𝐷
) (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
− 𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝛼+1)
𝛼+𝛽
]
−
1
𝜎
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𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= [𝜍−𝜀 (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
(
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
) 
𝜍
𝜀
1+ 𝜎 (
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽+𝛼𝜎
(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 
 
𝑃𝐾
𝑃𝑅
= [𝜍
−𝜎𝜀
1+ 𝜎 (
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐷
)
𝜎
1+ 𝜎
(
𝐿𝐶
−𝛾𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
−𝛾𝐿𝐷
)
𝛼(𝜎−1)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
(
𝐿𝐶
𝐿𝐷
)
−𝛼(𝜎−1)
𝛼+𝛽
(
𝐾
𝑅
)
𝛽(𝛼−1)+(𝛽+𝛼𝜎)(1+𝜎)
(1+ 𝜎)(𝛼+𝛽)
]
−
1
𝜎
 (A.12) 
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